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Abstract
I compare in-kind reimbursement and reimbursement insurance. I ex-
plicitly consider outpatient and inpatient care in a model where illness has
a negative impact on labor productivity. Consumers are heterogeneous with
respect to intensity of preferences for treatment which is their private infor-
mation. Then the social planner has a choice of two kinds of reimbursement
structure: pooling (uniform) and self-selecting allocations.
Analyzing pooling allocations I show that reimbursement insurance weakly
dominates in-kind reimbursement. While considering self-selecting alloca-
tions I show that the two reimbursement methods are, from a social welfare
point of view, equivalent.
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1. Introduction
Risk averse consumers demand health insurance. They insure against the …nancial
risk associated with buying medical care. I will study alternative health insurance
reimbursement methods to …nd out which kind of payment is socially preferable.
In an ideal world, the optimal insurance contract from the social planner’s
point of view would pay lump-sum transfers contingent on the health status. If
illness occurs consumers would receive a cash payment related to the severity of
disease, so that consumer’s sovereignty would be completely preserved. In reality
we normally do not observe this type of reimbursement.
Instead of a cash payment, we generally observe either in-kind reimbursement
or reimbursement insurance (later on reimbursement on treatment cost). Gen-
erally, when reimbursement is in-kind, consumers are payed directly in medical
services. Payment is contingent on disease as it would be for cash reimbursement,
but, in the case of in-kind, consumers are not free to choose the quantity of treat-
ment they prefer. On the contrary, when reimbursement is on treatment cost,
insurance payment depends on consumers’ expenditures upon health care. In this
case instruments as coinsurance and deductible are used to limit overconsumption.
The representation of these reimbursement plans that I choose in the model is
not able to capture all their complex features but provides a treatable framework.
To be as simple as possible I assume that when reimbursement is in-kind (IK),
access to care is free and consumers receive a quantity of treatment determined
by the insurer. Imposing a ceiling on treatment available to consumers, insurance
is able to prevent high demand for care. This implies that in-kind reimbursement
allows cost-containment. At the same time an evident disadvantage of IK reim-
bursement is the cost on social welfare due to the imposition of a consumption
constraint to the insured people.
Concerning physician’s fee, an important consequence of free access to care
is that, with IK reimbursement, health care providers are payed directly by the
insurer.
Considering public health insurance systems which use to reimburse in-kind,
we generally refer to National Health Service type organizations. Great Britain,
Germany, Italy1 and, only for inpatient care, also France2 are an example.
1In Italy outpatient care reimbursement is rather complicate, but we can say that at least
GP services are provided in-kind.
2In some cases, in France, third party payer principle may take place also for outpatient care.
However it occurs only for chronic or very serious diseases or, more often, as the consequence of
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Conversely, when reimbursement is on treatment cost (TC) I assume that
consumers are free to choose the quantity of treatment they desire. A consequence
is that, not internalizing the entire health care cost, they demand an excessive
quantity of it (overconsumption). This is an ex-post moral-hazard problem.
Concerning again physician’s fee, with treatment cost reimbursement health
care providers generally are payed by consumers. The latter, after the insurance
claim, receive a partial reimbursement from the insurer. As an example this
reimbursement is used, only for outpatient care, in France3.
Figure 1 summarizes the trade-o¤, characterizing the two reimbursement meth-
ods, between consumers’ freedom in choosing treatment quantity and consumers’
incentive to not overconsume.
The importance of a uniform consumption constraint (in a sense which will
be clari…ed later) directly depends on the level of heterogeneity characterizing the
population. This suggests that it could exist a threshold value in consumers’ het-
erogeneity such that when heterogeneity is not too high in-kind reimbursement is
better, while, when heterogeneity is su¢ciently high, treatment cost reimburse-
ment is preferable.
To my knowledge this institutional comparison between alternative reimburse-
ment methods is still an unexplored issue.
Moreover this work provides a treatable framework for systems which use a
mix of in-kind and treatment cost reimbursement: outpatient care are reimbursed
on treatment cost and inpatient care are reimbursed in-kind. This is just the reim-
bursement plan used in France. In fact, in the case of outpatient care consumers
share a part of treatment costs, but they maintain an important level of freedom
in choosing treatment quantity. On the other side, for inpatient care, access to
care is free and treatment quantity is normally decided by the public insurance.
complementary private insurance purchase.
3The French system for outpatient care leave complete freedom to consumers: they choose the
provider (both generalist and specialist) and the number of examinations. Moreover consumers
directly pay for the services and the treatment prescribed. Later they ask for reimbursement to
the Social Insurance Administration and they are paid back approximately from the 60 to the
80% of their expenses.
Concerning French consumers’ freedom, the o¢ce based doctors convention introduced a vol-
untary scheme in 1987 which o¤ered the possibility to doctors of becoming “médecin référants”.
Patients who join this scheme have a moral commitment not to visit a specialist directly. The
aim of this scheme was essentially to check the e¢cacy of a possible cost containment measure.
But most doctors where reluctant (up to the end of 1997, only the 12,5 per cent of them had
joined the scheme) because of the fear that they may be more controlled by the health insurance
system. In fact in this scheme they are obliged to keep detailed patient records.
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Figure 1.1: trade-o¤ between consumers’ freedom and cost-containment.
Concerning the related literature, …rst, I have to mention the models on moral-
hazard in health insurance, one of the seminal papers being Zeckhauser (1970).
The way I treat treatment cost reimbursement represents a particular case of the
more general reimbursement schedule of his model. Second, concerning in-kind
reimbursement, I relate to the literature on in-kind transfers and optimal taxation
(among others Cremer and Gahvari (1997)). In that literature the self-selecting
property of in-kind transfers in second-best economies has been analyzed. Third,
more generally I refer to the literature on income taxation with uncertainty in
which taxation is used to insure consumers against various types of wage and
health risks (as an example, Varian (1980) and Cremer and Gahvari (1995)).
In the next pages I compare IK and TC reimbursement in a model of public
health insurance4. I assume that consumers are heterogeneous with respect both
to their state of health and to their preferences for treatment consumption. The
public insurer plays the role of the social planner and he is fully informed on
4A public health insurance has been analyzed for the …rst time in Blonqvist and Horn (1984).
The authors show that, if individuals di¤er in their earning ability and also in the probability of
falling ill, then a public health insurance is an e¢cient tool to redistribute welfare when income
taxation is linear.
Together with their focus on public health insurance, Blonqvist and Horn (1984) presents
another similarity with respect to this paper: in both the models consumers’ utilities are state-
dependent.
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consumers’ state of health. In the …rst part of the work I constrain the insurance
plan to be uniform in the sense that tastes heterogeneity is not taken into account.
Analyzing pooling allocations I …nd that TC dominates IK reimbursement. This
means that, contrary to intuition, there is no trade-o¤ between TC and IK de-
pending on consumers’ heterogeneity. In the second part, I consider self-selecting
allocations, i.e. allocations where consumers can choose insurance plans which
takes into account their preference for treatment. In this case I show that the two
reimbursement methods are, from a social welfare point of view, equivalent.
2. The model
Let us consider a representative consumer and three possible states of health. Con-
sumer can be healthy, not seriously ill and seriously ill. When not seriously ill, con-
sumer needs outpatient care, while when seriously ill, consumer needs inpatient
care. More precisely, with probability p1; consumer is in good health and has a
full earning ability, his marginal labor productivity is w1 (ability is normalized to
equal the wage rate). With probability p2; consumer is ill and, as a consequence,
he partially looses his earning ability; his marginal labor productivity falls to
w2 < w1: Finally, with probability p3 = 1 ¡ p1 ¡ p2; consumer is seriously ill
and looses all his earning ability (he is hospitalized); in this case marginal labor
productivity fall to w3 = 0:5
Consumer’s preferences are state-dependent and twice separable:
U ji (C;X;L) = u (Ci)¡ v (Li)¡Hi + µjiÁi (Xi)
i = 1; 2; 3 indicates health status as stated above, C is an aggregated consumption
good taken as numeraire, X is health care consumption and L is labor supply. Hi
is a …xed, state dependent, utility loss which can be partially recovered through
health care consumption. The term µjiÁi (Xi) indicates utility from health care
consumption. In particular Ái (Xi) is health improvement from treatment con-
sumption, while the parameter µji (0 < µ
l
i · µhi ; i = 2; 3; j = l; h) represents
intensity of preferences for treatment, i.e. heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes.
With probability ¹l consumer has low preference for health care consumption (he
is low-type), while, with probability ¹h = 1¡¹l he has high preference for health
care consumption (he is high-type), and this for both states of illness (bidimen-
sional heterogeneity).
5As I will show in section 5.1, illness severity plays an important role also with respect to
consumers’ tastes on consumption levels.
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Standard hypothesis on utility functions hold: u0 (Ci) > 0; u00 (Ci) < 0;
v0 (Li) > 0; v
00
(Li) > 0: H1 = 0 < H2 < H3. The function Á (X) is such
that: Á1 (X) = 0 8X; Ái (0) = 0; Á0i (X) > 0; Á00i (X) < 0; i = 2; 3: Moreover,
Hi > µ
j
iÁi (Xi) ; 8i = 2; 3; 8j = l; h and 8X; such that consumer’s utility is
always greater when in good health than when ill.
The social planner will be concerned with making comparisons of utility levels
across consumers’ types. Thus, I assume full comparability of consumers’ utilities.
The timing of the model is as follows: at t1 (interim) consumer learns his type
and at t2 (ex-post) the health-risk is realized and consumer learns his state of
health too. As it is shown in …gure 2, the social planner decides interim, while
consumer decides ex-post.
t2
(state of nature)
t1
(types)
t
Social Planner Consumer
Figure 2: timing.
In this model I focus on the relationship between consumer and public insur-
ance, the health care provider is not explicitly considered. The situation described
here …ts both the case of a public provider (vertically integrated with the public
insurer) and of a private one in a competitive market. In both cases, assuming a
linear technology, the health care unitary cost is constant. This allows us to say
that consumer and the public insurer face the same treatment price (q) :Moreover,
I assume that the provider behaves as a perfect agent for his patient.
Concerning the informational structure of public insurance, in the model con-
sumer has potentially two private informations: his health status (captured by the
marginal labor productivity wi) and his type µ
j
i (high/low taste for treatment).
I assume that consumers’ health status is observable. This means that, concern-
ing this aspect of the examination (as opposed to treatment purchase), collusion
between patient and physician is impossible: physician acts as a perfect agent
for insurance. As a consequence reimbursement can be contingent to the health
status. Conversely, I assume that, in each state of health, preference for treatment
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is not observable and public insurance can reimburse consumers according to a
pooling allocation or a self-selecting one.
The structure of the work is as follow. In the …rst part I will show the …rst-
best, then I will compare the alternative insurance plans when the Government
implements pooling allocations. In particular the considered plans are: cash,
in-kind, treatment costs reimbursement and, …nally, a mix of the two previous
methods. In the second part I will analyze the same reimbursement methods
when the social planner implements self-selecting allocations. To summarize, the
considered cases are:
Pooling allocations:
- …rst-best
- uniform plans:
- cash reimbursement
- in-kind reimbursement
- treatment cost reimbursement
- mix of reimbursement types
Self-selecting allocations:
- cash reimbursement
- in-kind reimbursement
- treatment cost reimbursement
- mix of reimbursement types
3. First-best
I assume that, exhibiting an illness certi…cation provided by a physician, patient
is entitled to receive reimbursement.
First-best is represented by a contract contingent both to the health status
and to preference for treatment, that is a plan characterized by …ve non-uniform
monetary transfers (P;Rl2; R
h
2 ; R
l
3; R
h
3): Consumption in the three states of health
is:
C1 = w1L1 ¡ P
C l2 = w2L
l
2 +R
l
2 ¡ qX l2
Ch2 = w2L
h
2 +R
h
2 ¡ qXh2
C l3 = R
l
3 ¡ qX l3
Ch3 = R
h
3 ¡ qXh3
where P is premium payed by healthy consumer, Rj2 (j = l; h) is net from
premium reimbursement for outpatient care and Rj3 (j = l; h) is reimbursement
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for inpatient care. With cash reimbursement consumer decides to purchase the
quantity of treatment he prefers. Note that in state of nature 3 cash transfer
Rj3 must be enough to let consumer purchase both health care and aggregated
consumption.
The social planner maximizes the utilitarian6 social welfare function SW =
¹lEU(µ
l) + ¹hEU(µ
h), where EU(µl) is low-type consumer’s expected utility and
EU(µh) is high-type consumer’s expected utility. Expected utility of low-type
and high-type individuals are respectively multiplied for the proportion of low-
type and high-type consumers in the population7: low and high type consumers
have the same weight for the social planner. Note that, when healthy, the two
consumer’ types are identical. The social planner solves:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Max
P;Rji ;L
j
i ;X
j
i
p1 [u(w1L1 ¡ P )¡ v(L1)]+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
j
2 ¡ qXj2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡Xj2¢¡ v(Lj2)¤+
+p3
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
Rj3 ¡ qXj3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡Xj3¢¤
s:t: : p1P = p2(¹lR
l
2 + ¹hR
h
2) + p3(¹lR
l
3 + ¹hR
h
3)
(3.1)
Two remarks can be useful. First, premium is fair. Second, because of the
way the heterogeneity parameter µji enters the utility functions, social welfare
is increasing with respect to heterogeneity. This is equivalent to say that high-
type consumers have the highest weight in this economy. As a consequence an
utilitarian social welfare function redistributes from low to high-type individuals8.
6Concerning the choice of the social welfare function it is interesting to say that the maximin
principle of Rawls is less applicable to cases which deals with health and the allocation of health
care. In fact while the need for Rawls’ primary goods (e.g. food and clothing) are more or less
the same for all, there is a much more unequal distribution of the need for health care re‡ecting
the ”natural lottery”. There are consequently much wider variations in the resources required
to meet such unequal distribution of needs. In particular the crucial issue for the maximin
criterion is the severity of the worst o¤. As long as it is feasible to improve the health of this
individual, resources would be directed to him irrespective of the forgone improvement for the
others.
For an interesting discussion on this subject see J.A.Olsen: ”Theory of justice and their
implication for priority setting in health care”, Journal of Health Economics 16, 1997, 625-639.
7Considering a large number of representative consumers, ¹j is equivalent, ex-post, to the
proportion of the j-type.
8For this reason, in the social welfare function, giving a higher (than ¹l) weight to low-type
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>From FOCs we …nd the full-insurance result9:
C1 = C
l
2 = C
h
2 = C
l
3 = C
h
3 (= C) (3.2)
Moreover it is:
L¤1 : w1u
0(C) = v0(L1) (3.3)
L¤2 : w2u
0(C) = v0(L2) (3.4)
X¤j2 : µ
j
2Á
0
2
¡
Xj2
¢
= qu0 (C) ; j = l; h: (3.5)
X¤j3 : µ
j
3Á
0
3
¡
Xj3
¢
= qu0 (C) ; j = l; h: (3.6)
As we expected, in every state of health labor supply and treatment quantity
are determined such that marginal bene…t equals marginal cost, as a consequence
MRSL2;X2 =
q
w2
. Moreover in state of health 2 it is: L¤l2 = L
¤h
2 and X
¤h
2 > X
¤l
2 ;
and in state of health 3 it is X¤h3 > X
¤l
3 : Concerning the monetary transfers, not
surprisingly one …nds: Rhi > R
l
i; i = 2; 3:
Note that the choice of Xji and Li can be decentralized because consumers face
prices wi and q. As a consequence the social planner can obtain …rst-best o¤ering
the …rst-best contract and letting consumers choose (ex-post) labor supply and
treatment quantity.
Here I brie‡y introduce the structure of in-kind and treatment cost reimburse-
ment with full information on consumers’ preferences. The two reimbursement
plans will be treated in detail in the case of asymmetric information in section 4.2
and 4.3, 7.3 and 7.4.
In-kind reimbursement
Recall that, when reimbursement is in-kind, access to care is free and con-
sumers receive the package of care ¹Xji which is determined by insurance. I as-
sume that the transfer ¹Xji has to be entirely consumed: no intermediate levels of
consumption are possible. This interpretation of in-kind reimbursement, which
represents a good approximation of reality, will become important analyzing self-
selecting allocations (section 7.3). Individuals’ consumption in the three states of
health is:
consumers would be more equitable. In fact it would allow to redress the relative importance of
the two consumers types. I leave it for future research.
9Here utilities are state-dependent and separable. Then, for any given income level, ill
health does not alter the marginal utility of income. As a consequence full insurance is optimal.
Moreover the full insurance condition concerns only aggregate consumption.
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C1 = w1L1 ¡ P IK
Cj2 = w2L
j
2 +R
IKj
2 ;
¡
Xj2 = ¹X
j
2
¢
Cj3 = R
IKj
3 ;
¡
Xj3 =
¹Xj3
¢
where j = l; h. Note that seriously ill consumers are obliged to consume ac-
cording to the transfer RIKj3 . This means that in-kind reimbursement imposes a
double constraint on seriously ill consumers: aggregate consumption and treat-
ment quantity. In section 4.2 it will be clear that this double constraint concerns
also not seriously ill consumers.
Reimbursement on treatment cost
With reimbursement insurance the social planner uses a cost-sharing param-
eter ®ji · 1 (i = 2; 3; j = l; h) 10 to reduce health care overconsumption. As it
was said before, the moral-hazard problem due to the subsidization of health care
corresponds to the main disadvantage of reimbursement on treatment cost.
As in the case of cash reimbursement, consumers choose their preferred treat-
ment quantity, the di¤erence is that here the social planner modi…es treatment
consumption prices. Consumption in the three states of health is:
C1 = w1L1 ¡ P TC
Cj2 = w2L
j
2 +R
TCj
2 ¡ ®j2qXj2
Cj3 = R
TCj
3 ¡ ®j3qXj3
It is evident that under perfect information in-kind and treatment cost reim-
bursement are both equivalent to …rst-best. In fact, with both reimbursements
methods the social planner can use four additional “instruments” (respectively
¹Xji with in-kind and ®
j
i with treatment cost reimbursement, i = 2; 3; j = l; h)
such that it can do at least as well: Actually when monetary transfers contingent
to preference for treatment are available, these additional instruments are useless.
Concerning treatment cost reimbursement, obviously with full information the
social planner sets ®ji = 1 such that prices are not distorted.
This result is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under perfect information, cash, in-kind and treatment cost
reimbursement are equivalent.
This result is in line with Arrow’s intuition. In fact, in his seminal paper
(Arrow (1963), page 962), he says that, in an hypothetically perfect market, the
10With full information considering either ®ji or simply ®i is equivalent:
10
existing di¤erent methods of treatment costs coverage should be equivalent.
In …gure 3 ill consumers’ …rst-best allocation is shown. As the reader can see,
the slope of low-type utility function is higher than high-type one, this happens
because dCi
dXi
= ¡µji
Á0i(X
j
i )
u0(Cji )
:
Ci
j
Ui
h
Ui
l
Ci
l = Ci
h
Xi
j
Xi
hXi
l
Figure 3: ill consumers’ …rst-best allocation.
When µj is not observable; …rst-best allocations cannot be implemented. In
fact, in state of health 2, …rst-best payment implies: C l2 = C
h
2 ; X
h
2 > X
l
2 and
Lh2 = L
l
2
11. And in state of health 3: C l3 = C
h
3 ; X
h
3 > X
l
3: This means that
low-type consumers would mimic high-type ones.
4. Uniform plans
Dealing with low-types incentive constraints the public insurance has a choice of
two kinds of reimbursement structure. Those in which the insurer is unable to
distinguish (ex-post or ex-ante) among individuals: this corresponds to a pooling
allocation. And those in which the high-type and the low-type can (ex-post)
11In particular it is: RIKli = R
IKh
i = R
j
i ¡ qXji = Rji ¡ q ¹Xji :
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be identi…ed as a result of the action undertaken by the di¤erent groups: this
corresponds to a self-selecting allocation.
The reimbursement plans that we observe in the European public health in-
surance systems are essentially uniform: public insurance does not o¤er contracts
which di¤er according to their recipients’ taste. In fact the same plan is proposed
to consumers with the same illness without caring about their (di¤erent) pref-
erences for treatment. A possible reason for implementing pooling allocations is
just the presence of an hidden incentive constraint as the one treated in this work:
facing o¤ the lack of information on consumer’s type, in the real world public in-
surance chooses to provide uniform reimbursements. Maybe this choice is due
to the presence of political constraints and/or administrative costs. Anyway, to
investigate on this interesting issue is not in the aim of this work.
4.1. Cash reimbursement
This plan is de…ned by three monetary transfers: (PC ; RC2 ; R
C
3 ): Ill consumers
receive reimbursement and choose in the market the preferred treatment quantity.
Consumption in the three states of health is:
C1 = w1L1 ¡ PC
Cj2 = w2L
j
2 +R
C
2 ¡ qXj2
Cj3 = R
C
3 ¡ qXj3
Note that the only di¤erence with respect to …rst-best is that here we add the
uniformity constraint Rhi = R
l
i = R
C
i :
Recalling that consumer maximizes ex-post, with cash reimbursement con-
sumers’ programs are as follow. Good health:
max
L1
u(w1L1 ¡ PC)¡ v(L1)
Then in state of health 1 labor supply is de…ned according to the following equa-
tion:
L¤1 : w1u
0(C1) = v0(L1) (4.1)
Outpatient care:
max
Lj2;X
j
2
u
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
C
2 ¡ qXj2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡Xj2¢¡ v(Lj2)
Then in state of health 2 labor supply and purchased treatment quantity are
respectively de…ned according to equations:
L¤j2 : w2u
0(Cj2) = v
0(Lj2); j = l; h; (4.2)
12
X¤j2 : µ
j
2Á
0
2
¡
Xj2
¢
= qu0
¡
Cj2
¢
; j = l; h: (4.3)
Inpatient care:
max
Xj3
u
¡
RC3 ¡ qXj3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡Xj3¢
Then in state of health 3 purchased treatment quantity is chosen according to
equation:
X¤j3 : µ
j
3Á
0
3
¡
Xj3
¢
= qu0
¡
Cj3
¢
; j = l; h: (4.4)
The social planner solves the following program:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Max
PC ;RC2 ;R
C
3
p1
£
u(w1L
¤
1 ¡ PC)¡ v(L¤1)
¤
+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
w2L
¤j
2 +R
C
2 ¡ qX¤j2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡X¤j2 ¢¡ v(L¤j2 )¤+
+p3
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
RC3 ¡ qX¤j3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡X¤j3 ¢¤
s:t: : p1P
C = p2R
C
2 + p3R
C
3
where labor supplies L¤i and treatment quantities X
¤j
i verify consumer’s FOCs
(4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4).
>From FOCs we …nd:
u0(C1) = E [u0 (C2)] = E [u0 (C3)] 12 (4.5)
As equation (4.5) shows, low and high-type consumers choose di¤erent aggregated
consumptions. Full insurance is preserved only in average. This distortion from
the full insurance represents the cost the uniformity constraint imposes.
Totally di¤erentiating equations (4.2) and (4.3) one …nds that
dL2
dX2
> 0 and
dX2
dµ2
> 0. Then, not surprisingly, it is: Xh2 > X
l
2 and L
h
2 > L
l
2: As a consequence
we are not able to say neither if Ch2 is higher or lower than C
l
2 nor which not
seriously ill consumers’ type is characterized by the higher utility level13. In the
same way, totally di¤erentiating equation (4.4), one …nds that
dX3
dµ3
> 0 so that
12E [u0 (Ci)] = ¹l u0
¡
Cli
¢
+ ¹h u
0 ¡Chi ¢ :
13In fact it is: Uh2 ¡ U l2 = u
¡
Ch2
¢¡ u ¡Cl2¢+ µh2Á2 ¡Xh2 ¢ ¡ µl2Á2 ¡Xl2¢+ v ¡Ll2¢¡ v ¡Lh2¢ 7 0;
where Uh2 and U
l
2 respectively are h-type and l-type not seriously ill consumer’s utility and
Xh2 > X
l
2; L
h
2 > L
l
2; C
h
2 7 Cl2.
13
Xh3 > X
l
3: Then C
l
3 > C
h
3 : But, again, we cannot a priori say which seriously ill
consumers’ type is characterized by the higher utility level14.
4.2. In-kind reimbursement
This plan is characterized by three monetary transfers15 and by two packages of
care: (P IK; RIK2 ; R
IK
3 ; ¹X2; ¹X3):
Individuals’ consumption in the three states of health is:
C1 = w1L1 ¡ P IK
C2 = w2L2 +R
IK
2 ;
¡
Xj2 = ¹X2
¢
C3 = R
IK
3 ;
¡
Xj3 = ¹X3
¢
With respect to …rst-best I added both the uniformity constraint Rhi = R
l
i =
RIKi and the consumption constraint ¹X
j
i =
¹Xi: That is one more constraint with
respect to (uniform) cash reimbursement. This allows us to say that, with in-kind
reimbursement, consumers cannot be better o¤. In session 5 it will be clear that
consumers are always worse o¤ (proposition 2).
Healthy consumers’ program is the same I showed in the previous case and
equation (4.1), where P IK substitute P; still holds.
Outpatient care:
max
L2
u
¡
w2L2 +R
IK
2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡ ¹X2¢¡ v(L2)
Then, in state of health 2, labor supply is:
L¤2 : w2u
0(C2) = v0(L2) (4.6)
Note that here, because of the separability of preferences, both types of not seri-
ously ill consumers have the same labor supply L¤2. As a consequence C
h
2 = C
l
2 =
C2: This means that imposing the constraint on treatment quantity, in-kind reim-
bursement yields to the same aggregate consumption for both consumers’ types.
The same holds for inpatient care. In fact consumers are constrained to RIK3 and
¹X3 and their utility is: u(RIK3 ) ¡ H3 + µj3Á3( ¹X3): In other words in-kind reim-
bursement imposes the following two constraints to ill consumers: Chi = C
l
i = Ci
and ¹Xhi = ¹X
l
i = ¹Xi:
14In fact it is: Uh3 ¡ U l3 = u
¡
Ch3
¢¡ u ¡Cl3¢+ µh3Á3 ¡Xh3 ¢¡ µl3Á3 ¡Xl3¢ 7 0; where Uh3 and U l3
respectively are h-type and l-type seriously ill consumer’s utility and Ch3 < C
l
3; X
h
3 > X
l
3.
15In fact, being the health status observable, the social planner is always able to use the
monetary transfers Ri: Note that the transfer RIK2 can be, and presumably is, negative (the
social planner can collect resources also from not seriously ill consumer).
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With in-kind reimbursement, in both states of illness it is:
Uhi ¡ U li = Ái
¡
¹Xi
¢ ¡
µhi ¡ µli
¢
> 0 i = 2; 3
where Uhi and U
l
i respectively are high-type and low-type utility. This inequality
means that high-type utility is always larger than low-type utility: with in-kind
reimbursement low-type consumers are always worse o¤16. The di¤erence between
the two utility levels is proportional to heterogeneity.
The public insurance program is:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Max
P IK ;RIKi ;
¹Xi
p1
£
u(w1L
¤
1 ¡ P IK)¡ v(L¤1)
¤
+
+p2
h
u(w2L
¤
2 +R
IK
2 )¡H2 + eµ2Á2 ¡ ¹X2¢¡ v(L¤2)i+
+p3
h
u
¡
RIK3
¢¡H3 + eµ3Á3 ¡ ¹X3¢i
s:t: : p1P
IK = p2
¡
RIK2 + q ¹X2
¢
+ p3
¡
RIK3 + q ¹X3
¢
where eµi = P
j=l;h
¹jµ
j
i : In fact, to implement the pooling allocation, the Government
maximizes the utility of a representative consumer: the mean µ-type consumer.
Not surprisingly, from FOCs with respect to P IK; RIK2 and R
IK
3 we …nd the
full-insurance condition:
C1 = C2 = C3 = ¹C (4.7)
Moreover treatment packages are determined according to:
¹X2 : eµ2Á02 ¡ ¹X2¢ = qu0( ¹C) (4.8)
¹X3 : eµ3Á03 ¡ ¹X3¢ = qu0( ¹C) (4.9)
Obviously neither type of ill and seriously ill consumers receive the optimal quan-
tity of treatment (determined respectively by equation (3.5) for outpatient care
and by equation (3.6) for inpatient care) because ¹X2 and ¹X3 are determined ac-
cording to the mean-µ-type consumer.
It is evident that, when there is no heterogeneity
¡
µl2 = µ
h
2 ; µ
l
3 = µ
h
3
¢
; we are
back to …rst-best.
16While with cash reimbursement it was Uhi ¡ U li 7 0.
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4.3. Reimbursement on treatment cost
As I said before ®i represents the coinsurance parameter, it is di¤erent for out-
patient and inpatient care. The uniform plan is characterized by three monetary
transfers17 and by the two coinsurance parameters:
¡
P TC ; RTC2 ; R
TC
3 ; ®2; ®3
¢
. In-
dividuals’ consumption in the three states of health is:
C1 = w1L1 ¡ P TC
Cj2 = w2L
j
2 +R
TC
2 ¡ ®2qXj2
Cj3 = R
TC
3 ¡ ®3qXj3
With respect to …rst-best the uniformity constraints on the monetary transfers
(Rhi = R
l
i = R
TC
i ) and on the coinsurance parameters (®
j
i = ®i) has been added.
Consumers’ programs are the following. Healthy consumers’ decision is the
same I showed in the previous cases and equation (4.1) still holds.
Outpatient care:
max
Lj2;X
j
2
u
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
TC
2 ¡ ®2qXj2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡Xj2¢¡ v(Lj2)
As a consequence labor supply is determined, again, according to equation (4.2),
moreover treatment quantity is:
X¤j2 : µ
j
2Á
0
2
¡
Xj2
¢
= ®2qu
0 ¡Cj2¢ ; j = l; h (4.10)
Inpatient care:
max
Xj3
u
¡
RTC3 ¡ ®3qXj3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡Xj3¢
As a consequence treatment quantity is:
X¤j3 : µ
j
3Á
0
3
¡
Xj3
¢
= ®3qu
0 ¡Cj3¢ ; j = l; h (4.11)
17As in the case of in-kind reimbursement, the transfer RTC2 can be negative.
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The public insurance program is:188>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Max
PTC ;RTCi ;®i
p1
£
u(w1L
¤
1 ¡ P TC)¡ v(L¤1)
¤
+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
w2L
¤j
2 +R
TC
2 ¡ ®2qX¤j2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡X¤j2 ¢¡ v(L¤j2 )¤+
+p3
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
RTC3 ¡ ®3qX¤j3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡X¤j3 ¢¤
s:t: : p1P
TC = p2 (1¡ ®2) q
P
j=l;h
¹jX
¤j
2 + p2R
TC
2 +
+p3 (1¡ ®3) q
P
j=l;h
¹jX
¤j
3 + p3R
TC
3
>From FOCs with respect to P TC ; RTC2 and R
TC
3 one …nds the following equation:
E [u0(Ci)] = u0(C1)
·
1 + (1¡ ®i)qE
·
@Xi
@RTCi
¸¸
i = 2; 3 (4.12)
It is interesting to remark that equation (4.12) would be equivalent to (4.5) for
®i = 1; i = 2; 3: However it is easy to show that, because of consumers’ hetero-
geneity, this will never be the case at the optimal treatment cost reimbursement
policy19. Then ®i; i = 2; 3 are always di¤erent from 1 for positive level of hetero-
geneity.
Obviously when there is no heterogeneity it is optimal to impose ®i = 1;
i = 2; 3 and …rst-best is obtained.
>From FOCs with respect to the coinsurance parameters one …nds:·
¡ (1¡ ®i)E
µ
@Xi
@®i
¶
+ E (Xi)
¸
u0 (C1) = E [Xiu0 (Ci)] (4.13)
The interpretation of equation (4.13) is as follows: the left hand side represents
consumers’ marginal cost and the right hand side consumers’ marginal bene…t
18As it is normally the case in health insurance models, I do not impose any constraint on
the coinsurance parameters ®i; i = 2; 3, and I will verify ex-post if they are less or higher than
unity.
19In fact, from equation (4.14) below, which describes the optimal coinsurance parameter, we
know that ®i = 1 implies
u0(C1) =
E [Xiu
0(Ci)]
E (Xi)
, i = 2; 3; and from equations (4.12) that ®i = 1 implies u0(C1) =
E [u0(Ci)] ; i = 2; 3. This means that it must be E [u0(Ci)]E (Xi) = E [Xiu0(Ci)] ; which is
impossible because Ci depends also on Xi.
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from a negative variation of ®i (a fall in treatment price). When ®i decreases,
consumers out of pocket expenses decrease as well, while insurance reimbursement
expenses increases. As a consequence insurance premium must increase as well.
Marginal cost is measured by marginal variation of insurance premium (in bracket)
multiplied for marginal utility of consumption in state ”good health”. In fact
premium is paid by healthy consumers. In the right hand side the positive income
e¤ect from a negative variation of ®i is measured by the product of treatment
quantity and consumption marginal utility in the illness status. Mean values
appear because a uniform plan is implemented. To …nd the optimal coinsurance
parameters, equation (4.13) can be rewritten as:
®i = 1¡ u
0(C1)E(Xi)¡E [Xiu0(Ci)]
u0(C1)E
·
@Xi
@®i
¸ (4.14)
The coinsurance parameters are positively correlated to treatment demand mean
derivatives with respect to ®i; these terms are a measure of moral hazard. More-
over @Xi
@®i
is related to price elasticity of demand for treatment so that equation
(4.14) reminds us the inverse elasticity rule in Ramsey taxation: the commodity
whose demand is more inelastic is subsidized more.20
Verifying ex-post if it is optimal to impose a subsidy (®i < 1) or a tax (®i > 1) ;
we …nd21 that a su¢cient condition to subsidize treatment is:
u0 (C1) < ¹lu
0 ¡C li¢+ ¹hu0 ¡Chi ¢ i = 2; 3 (4.15)
while a necessary condition to tax treatment is the opposite of (4.15).
The right hand side of the previous inequality is average marginal utility of
consumption in the illness status. Marginal utility being decreasing, the interpre-
tation of (4.15) is the following: it is optimal to subsidize treatment if healthy
individuals consumption is larger than a particular mean of the ill individuals one.
This means that the social planner may impose a tax on treatment.
4.4. Mix of reimbursement types
Consider now a reimbursement which pays on treatment cost for outpatient care
and which pays in-kind for inpatient care. The mix of reimbursement types (MT)
20As it will be clari…ed in section 5.1, elasticity is higher for outpatient care. Then we expect
that ®2 > ®3:
21>From (4.14) the following yields:
®i < 1, cov(Xi; u0(Ci))+E (Xi) [E (u0 (Ci))¡ u0 (Ci)] > 0; where cov(Xi; u0(Ci)) is positive:
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is characterized by the following instruments: (PMT ; RMT2 ; R
MT
3 ; ®2; ¹X3): Con-
sumption levels are:
C1 = w1L1 ¡ PMT
Cj2 = w2L
j
2 +R
MT
2 ¡ ®2qXj2
C3 = R
MT
3 ;
¡
Xj3 = ¹X3
¢
As before, healthy consumers choose their labor supply according to FOC
(4.1). Not seriously ill consumers choose simultaneously their labor supply and
treatment quantity such that they respectively verify FOCs (4.2) and (4.10). As
with in-kind reimbursement, seriously ill consumers’ utility is u(RMT3 )+µ
j
3Á3
¡
¹X3
¢
:
The public insurance program is:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
Max
PMT ;RMTi ;®2;
¹X3
p1
£
u(w1L
¤
1 ¡ PMT )¡ v(L¤1)
¤
+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
w2L
¤j
2 +R
MT
2 ¡ ®2qX¤j2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡X¤j2 ¢¡ v(L¤j2 )¤+
+p3
h
u
¡
RMT3
¢¡H3 + eµ3Á3 ¡ ¹X3¢i
s:t: : p1P
MT = p2 (1¡ ®2) q
P
j=l;h ¹jX
¤j
2 + p2R
MT
2 + p3
¡
RMT3 + q ¹X3
¢
>From FOCs with respect to PMT and RMT3 one …nds that: C1 = C3 = R
MT
3 :
As we expected, full-insurance concerns only healthy and seriously ill consumers’
aggregated consumption. Moreover FOCs with respect to RMT2 ; ®2 and ¹X3 deter-
mine respectively equations (4.12), (4.14) and (4.9).
5. Comparing the alternative uniform reimbursement plans
>From proposition 1 the following corollary holds.
Corollary 1 In the case of pooling allocations if consumers are homoge-
neous, in-kind, treatment cost and a mix of types reimbursement are identical and
equivalent to uniform cash payment.
In fact when consumers are homogeneous the uniformity constraint has no
consequence on social welfare and we are back to …rst-best.
Reintroducing heterogeneity, the following result holds.22
22In the following the ranking among reimbursement schemes will be stated with the symbols
º and ¼ respectively for weak dominance and equivalence.
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Proposition 2 In the case of pooling allocations a …rst reimbursement meth-
ods ranking is the following: treatment cost reimbursement º cash reimbursement
º in-kind reimbursement.
Proof. (i) Uniform cash weakly dominates uniform in-kind reimbursement. In
fact, recalling the discussion in session 4.2, cash reimbursement is characterized
only by the uniformity constraint while in-kind reimbursement has one more con-
straint on treatment consumption. Once the monetary transfers R2 and R3 have
been …xed it is always better to let consumers choose treatment, being consump-
tion prices not distorted. (ii) Uniform treatment cost weakly dominates uniform
cash reimbursement. In fact cash reimbursement is characterized by three mone-
tary transfers (PC ; RC2 ; R
C
3 ) while treatment cost is characterized by three mone-
tary transfers and by two tax/subsidies on treatment price23 (P TC ; RTC2 ; R
TC
3 ; ®2;
®3), i.e. treatment cost has two more instruments. Moreover, for ®2 = ®3 = 1;
treatment cost is equivalent to cash reimbursement. As a consequence treatment
cost is at least as well as cash reimbursement.
Remark that the parameters ®2 and ®3 that we have introduced as the source
of moral-hazard in treatment cost reimbursement, actually do not represent a
cost. In fact the distortion they impose on treatment price has a positive e¤ect
on social welfare. The reason is that ®2 and ®3 are used to smooth consumption
between di¤erent consumers’ types in the same health status, such that TC op-
timal allocation can approach full insurance. In other words ®2 and ®3 allow to
indirectly and partially avoid the consequences of the uniformity constraint24.
Comparing uniform mix of types with uniform in-kind and uniform treatment
cost reimbursement one …nds:
Proposition 3 In the case of pooling allocations a second reimbursement
methods ranking is the following: treatment cost reimbursement º a mix of types
º in-kind reimbursement.
Proof. A mix of types pays on treatment cost for outpatient care and in-kind
for inpatient care. From proposition 2 we saw that treatment cost dominates
23See the discussion at the end of section 4.3.
24In fact, loosely speaking, if we consider for example inpatient care, ®3 (< 1) lets ¢C3 =
Cl3 ¡ Ch3 = ®3q
¡
Xh3 ¡Xl3
¢
be lower with respect to ¢C3 (cash) = q
¡
Xh3 ¡Xl3
¢
: (The same
argument holds for ¢C2) Note that for ®3 = 0 it would be Cl3 = C
h
3 , but in this case moral-
hazard would be too costly. This is the standard trade-o¤ between moral-hazard and optimal
risk spreading.
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in-kind. Then, considering MT with respect to TC, seriously ill consumers are
worse o¤, while not seriously ill consumers are indi¤erent. As a consequence TC
weakly dominates MT. On the other side, considering MT with respect to IK, not
seriously ill consumers are better o¤, while seriously ill consumers are indi¤erent.
As a consequence MT weakly dominates IK. One can conclude that treatment
cost weakly dominates a mix of types which weakly dominates in-kind.
To …nd a more general result, that is a ranking of cash and MT, I will introduce
in the next section an assumption on the structure of consumers’ heterogeneity.
5.1. Unidimensional heterogeneity
Regarding heterogeneity, empirical evidence shows that, in the case of serious
illness, the price elasticity of demand for treatments is small25. A reasonable
interpretation is that patients, for such an illness, have the sentiment that there
is only one appropriate treatment. Moreover, this allows us to say that, in the
case of inpatient care, heterogeneity is small and, as a consequences, a uniform
consumption constraint will have a low impact on social welfare. Given these
considerations I set µh2 ¡ µl2 ¸ µh3 ¡ µl3 ¸ 0; so that heterogeneity is lower in the
case of serious illness.
The particular case of unidimensional heterogeneity (µh2 ¡ µl2 > µh3 ¡ µl3 = 0) is
interesting because it can represent a good approximation of reality.
Considering the uniform mix of reimbursement types in the particular case
with no heterogeneity on serious illness the following remark holds:
Remark 1 In the case of pooling allocations if seriously ill consumers are
homogeneous, a mix of types is equivalent to treatment cost reimbursement.
In fact, if seriously ill consumers are homogeneous, from corollary 1 we know
that all the reimbursement methods are equivalent to cash. This implies that,
concerning inpatient care, treatment cost and a mix of types are equivalent. While
concerning outpatient care, treatment cost and a mix of types are the same by
de…nition.
As a result it is possible to de…ne a complete ranking of the four reimbursement
methods when seriously ill consumers are homogeneous:
25Results from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment show that health care price elasticities
belong to the range [-0.1 , -0.2]. In particular, concerning serious illness treatment consumption,
results show that ”there are no signi…cant di¤erences among the coinsurance plans in the use of
inpatient care services.” (Manning and others (1987), page 258)
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Proposition 4 In the case of pooling allocations if seriously ill consumers
are homogeneous (unidimensional heterogeneity), the complete reimbursement meth-
ods ranking is as follows: treatment cost reimbursement ´ mix of types º cash
reimbursement º in-kind reimbursement.
5.2. Bidimensional heterogeneity
With bidimensional heterogeneity (µh2 ¡ µl2 ¸ µh3 ¡ µl3 ¸ 0) it exists a trade-o¤
between cash reimbursement and a mix of reimbursement types such that it can be
either -cash dominates a mix of types- or the opposite. In fact, from proposition 2,
cash weakly dominates in-kind, as a consequence seriously ill consumers are better
o¤ with cash reimbursement. At the same time treatment cost weakly dominates
cash, as a consequence not seriously ill consumers are better o¤ with the mix of
reimbursement types.
Indeed, concerning this problem, one can make the following remark: the so-
cial welfare function used in the model suggests that uniform mix of types weakly
dominates uniform cash reimbursement. In fact, …rst of all, in reality inpatient
care are less frequent than outpatient ones: p3 < p2. Second, I assumed that
heterogeneity is lower in the case of serious illness: A simple way to represent this
situation it is to normalize µl2 = µ
l
3 = 1 such that µ
h
i ¡ 1 measures heterogene-
ity. Then it is µh2 ¸ µh3 ¸ 1. In this way, the heterogeneity structure gives even
more weight to not seriously ill consumers. As a consequence, a mix of types,
giving more utility to not seriously ill consumers, should reach the higher level of
social welfare. After the previous considerations we expect that, when heterogene-
ity is bidimensional, the complete reimbursement methods ranking is as follows:
treatment cost reimbursement º a mix of types º cash reimbursement º in-kind
reimbursement. Notice that this is not a general result because it depends on a
more assumption (p3 < p2) and on a speci…c normalization (µ
l
2 = µ
l
3 = 1):
As we said in the introduction, it seems natural to expect that the trade-o¤
between in-kind and treatment cost reimbursement is a¤ected by the degree of
heterogeneity (see …gure 1). Proposition 2 shows that this is not the case. The
reason is that treatment cost makes use of two more instruments and imposes no
constraints on consumption. This result is strictly related to a crucial assumption
of the model: the health status is observable. This assumption implies that the
social planner can always use monetary transfers contingent on the health status.
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6. Self-selecting allocations
Dealing with self-selecting allocations, the previous ranking of reimbursement
methods may be substantially a¤ected. With this respect, a …rst important fact
is that now the constraint on treatment quantity imposed by in-kind reimburse-
ment becomes a useful instrument. Directly providing (indivisible) in-kind health
services, the social planner can observe the treatment consumed by ill individuals,
as we shall see.
As both the health status (captured by consumers’ marginal labor productivity
wi) and the pre-tax revenue (wiLi) are observable, labor supply is known and is
always part of the contracts proposed by the social planner to consumers.26
Consider now treatment quantity. Except when reimbursement is in-kind,
treatment quantity is not observable by the social planner and mimicking on
health care consumption arises.27 Obviously, if treatment consumption Xji is not
observable, then consumer’s aggregate consumption (Cji = wiL
j
i+R
jTC
i ¡(®ji )qXji )
is not observable too. With in-kind reimbursement, on the contrary, treatment
quantity is observable. This follows from the interpretation of in-kind transfer ¹Xji
as an indivisible package of care (see section 3).
The social planner’s programs addressed in this section are standard cases of
mechanism design under adverse selection. Looking for the optimal mechanism
of each reimbursement scheme, I will then employ the well known Revelation
Principle28. Hence, I will study direct mechanisms in which consumers (truthfully)
announce their type µ and the insurer o¤ers an allocation which speci…es all the
relevant variables in the contractual relationship with consumers.
Notice that for each reimbursement method we shall look for the social plan-
ner’s optimal allocations attainable within each reimbursement scheme. This
means that, as we shall make clearer, the available reimbursement plans will
26See the conclusions for an extension of the model, in line with the Optimal Taxation liter-
ature (Stiglitz (1987), among others), with asymmetric information (also) on the health status.
27In the case of cash reimbursement it is evident that insurance has no way to control con-
sumers’ treatment purchase. On the contrary, in the case of treatment cost reimbursement,
consumers present the physician’s invoice and then receive reimbursement from the insurance.
As a consequence, in this case we can say that treatment quantity is ex-post observable. How-
ever, in the real world this information is generally not used by the insurance (which, in fact,
implements linear commodity tax on treatment, represented in this model by the parameter
®ji ). For this reason in the model treatment quantity is not observable with treatment cost
reimbursement as well. I will come back to these considerations later (see note (31)).
28Myerson (1979), among others.
23
not necessarily allow to obtain the second-best optimum. The reason is obviously
that some of them are instrument-constrained.
To have consumers truthfully report their type, the social planner has to max-
imize his objective function under (also) the incentive compatibility constraints.
As it has been shown at the end of section 3, the low-type consumers are the
mimickers. Standard mechanism design techniques with discrete types (see Fun-
denberg and Tirole (1991), pages 246-250) show that it is optimal to make the
mimikers’ incentive compatibility constraints binding thus implying that all the
other constraints are satis…ed.29 As a consequence, to recover the separating allo-
cations I will add two incentive constraints to the social planner’s program: one
for the low-type not seriously ill consumers and another for the low-type seriously
ill consumers.
6.1. Cash reimbursement
Separating cash reimbursement is characterized by four monetary transfers
¡
P;Rj2; R3
¢
and by consumers’ labor supplies (Lji ); j = l; h; i = 1; 2. In particular insurance
o¤ers the following contracts: (P; L1) for healthy consumers, the couple of con-
tracts
¡
Ll2; R
l
2
¢
and
¡
Lh2 ; R
h
2
¢
respectively for low and high-type not seriously ill
consumers and the uniform transfer R3 for both seriously ill consumers’ types
as, in this case, the only variable the social planner can control is the monetary
transfers and then no separation can be obtained in the seriously ill state.
Notice that this means the social planner cannot discriminate between the two
seriously ill consumers’ type and is obliged to o¤er a pooling contract. Thus, only
low-type not seriously ill incentive constraint appears in the insurance program.
With respect to treatment, not seriously and seriously ill consumers will re-
spectively choose treatment quantity according to equations (6.1) and (6.2):
X¤j2 : µ
j
2Á
0
2 (X2)¡ qu0
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
j
2 ¡ qX2
¢
= 0 (6.1)
X¤j3 : µ
j
3Á
0
3 (X3)¡ qu0
¡
Rj3 ¡ qX3
¢
= 0 (6.2)
while the mimicker will choose the preferred quantity according to the following
equation:
X¤lh2 : µ
l
2Á
0
2 (X2)¡ qu0
¡
w2L
h
2 +R
h
2 ¡ qX2
¢
= 0 (6.3)
29A formal proof of this result is standard and then omitted. A complete proof is available
from the author.
24
The social planner program then is:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Max
P;Rj2;R3;L
j
i
p1 [u(w1L1 ¡ P )¡ v(L1)] +
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
j
2 ¡ qX¤j2
¡
µj2; L
j
2; R
j
2
¢¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡X¤j2 ¡µj2; Lj2; Rj2¢¢+
¡v ¡Lj2¢¤+ p3 X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
R3 ¡ qX¤j3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡X¤j3 ¢¤
s:t: : p1P = p2
¡
¹lR
l
2 + ¹hR
h
2
¢
+ p3R3 (°)
u
¡
w2L
l
2 +R
l
2 ¡ qX¤l2
¡
µl2; L
l
2; R
l
2
¢¢
+ µl2Á2
¡
X¤l2
¡
µl2; L
l
2; R
l
2
¢¢¡ v(Ll2) ¸
u
¡
w2L
h
2 +R
h
2 ¡ qX¤lh2
¡
µl2; L
h
2 ; R
h
2
¢¢
+ µl2Á2
¡
X¤lh2
¡
µl2; L
h
2 ; R
h
2
¢¢¡ v(Lh2) (¸)
where ° 6= 0 and ¸ ¸ 0 are respectively the budget constraint Lagrange multiplier
and the incentive constraint Khun Tucker multiplier.
>From FOCs with respect to P and L1 one respectively …nds:
u0(C1)¡ ° = 0 (6.4)
w1u
0(C1)¡ v0(L1) = 0 (6.5)
which imply ° > 0. Moreover, as we expected, healthy consumer’s allocation is
such that marginal bene…t equals marginal cost of labor supply.
>From FOC with respect to Rl2 one …nds:
p2¹l + ¸
p2¹l
u0
¡
C l2
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.6)
such that, using equation (6.4), C l2 > C1.
>From FOC with respect to Ll2 it follows:
w2u
0 ¡C l2¢¡ v ¡Ll2¢ = 0 (6.7)
and there is no distortion for the low-type not seriously ill consumer.
>From FOC with respect to Rh2 one …nds:
u0
¡
Ch2
¢¡ ¸
p2¹h
u0
¡
C lh2
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.8)
where C lh2 is the mimicker’s aggregate consumption. From equations (6.4) and
(6.8) it follows that Ch2 < C1.
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>From FOC with respect to Lh2 one …nds:
w2u
0 ¡Ch2 ¢¡ v ¡Lh2¢
w2u0
¡
C lh2
¢¡ v ¡Lh2¢ ¡ ¸p2¹h = 0 (6.9)
Substituting (6.8) in (6.9) and rearranging one …nds:
p2¹h ¡ ¸
p2¹h
v0
¡
Lh2
¢¡ °w2 = 0 (6.10)
Such that it must be p2¹h¡ ¸ > 0. Moreover, using (6.6) and (6.7), (6.10) shows
that Ll2 < L
h
2 : Concerning high-type distortion, for the (6.3) the mimicker will
choose X lh2 < X
h
2 ; then C
lh
2 > C
h
2 : As a consequence, (6.9) does not contradict
that p2¹h ¡ ¸ > 0 only if w2u0
¡
C lh2
¢ ¡ v ¡Lh2¢ < w2u0 ¡Ch2 ¢ ¡ v ¡Lh2¢ < 0, and
then w2u0
¡
Ch2
¢
< v
¡
Lh2
¢
: This means that high-type not seriously ill consumer is
forced to supply too much labor and to under-consume (with respect to aggregate
consumption).
Finally, from the FOC with respect to R3 one …nds the same result obtained
for uniform cash reimbursement:
E [u0 (C3)] = u0 (C1)
High-type consumers, having a higher preference for treatment, choose an higher
treatment quantity with respect to low-type consumers. Seriously ill consumers’
pooling allocation in the case of cash reimbursement is represented in …gure 4.
U3l
U3h
X3j
C3j
C3l
C3h
X3l X3h
Figure 4: seriously ill consumers’ allocation with cash reimbursement.
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Note that the two point in …gure 4 are incentive compatible (no type prefers the
consumption bundle of the other type) but, obviously, no one of the two incentive
constraints is binding (recall that in the seriously ill state no separation can be
obtained because a unique instrument can be used, the monetary transfer). This
anticipates that cash will be easily dominated by other reimbursement schemes.
The following proposition summarizes the previous results concerning the sep-
arating cash allocation:
Proposition 5 The optimal cash self-selecting allocation is such that: contracts¡
Ll2; R
l
2
¢
and
¡
Lh2 ; R
h
2
¢
verify Ll2 < L
h
2 and C
l
2 > C
h
2 : There is no distortion for
low-type consumer. On the contrary high type consumer is forced to supply too
much labor and to consume too less aggregate consumption (w2u0(Ch2 ) < v
0(Lh2)).
Both seriously ill types receive a monetary transfer R3 and choose treatment and
aggregate consumption such that X l3 < X
h
3 and C
l
3 > C
h
3 :
6.2. In-kind reimbursement
In-kind reimbursement is characterized by …ve monetary transfers (P;Rj2; R
j
3); by
consumers’ labor supplies (Lji ) and by the transfers ¹X
j
i ; i = 2; 3; j = l; h. As I an-
ticipated in section 3, it is reasonable to assume that the in-kind transfer ¹Xji is an
indivisible package of care30 such that the social planner can observe treatment
consumption. As a consequence, with in-kind reimbursement, aggregate con-
sumption, treatment quantity and labor supply are all observable. The contracts
proposed in the three states then are (C1; L1) ; (C l2; X
l
2; L
l
2); (C
h
2 ;X
h
2 ; L
h
2); (C
l
3;X
l
3)
and (Ch3 ; X
h
3 ). It is interesting to notice that in-kind represents the unconstrained
direct mechanism in the sense that, given the agent’s type announcement, all the
relevant variables are chosen by the social planner. As a consequence we can an-
ticipate that the in-kind optimal allocation corresponds to the allocation which
weakly dominates the others.
30Letting consumers choose the preferred treatment quantity under the constraints Xji · ¹Xji ;
the in-kind reimbursement self-selecting allocation would be very similar to the cash reimburse-
ment one. The only di¤erence would be that with IK Cji is observable.
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The social planner’s program then is318>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Max
Cji ;L
j
i ;
¹Xji
p1 [u(C1)¡ v(L1)]+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
Cj2
¢¡H2 + µj2Á2 ¡ ¹Xj2¢¡ v ¡Lj2¢¤+
+p3
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
Cj3
¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡ ¹Xj3¢¤
s:t: : p1 (w1L1 ¡ C1) = p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
¡
Cj2 ¡ w2Lj2
¢
+ p3
X
j=l;h
¹jC
j
3+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹jq ¹X
j
2 + p3
X
j=l;h
¹jq ¹X
j
3 (°)
u
¡
C l2
¢
+ µl2Á2
¡
¹X l2
¢¡ v ¡Ll2¢ ¸ u ¡Ch2 ¢+ µl2Á2 ¡ ¹Xh2 ¢¡ v ¡Lh2¢ (¸2)
u
¡
C l3
¢
+ µl3Á3
¡
¹X l3
¢ ¸ u ¡Ch3 ¢+ µl3Á3 ¡ ¹Xh3 ¢ (¸3)
where ° 6= 0 and ¸2;¸3 ¸ 0 respectively are the budget constraint Lagrange
multiplier and the incentive constraints Khun Tucker multipliers.
>From FOCs with respect to C1 and L1 one …nds respectively equations (6.4)
and (6.5).
>From FOC with respect to C l2 it follows:
p2¹l + ¸2
p2¹l
u0
¡
C l2
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.11)
and then (6.4) and (6.11) imply C l2 > C1: From FOC with respect to L
l
2 :
p2¹l + ¸2
p2¹l
v0
¡
Ll2
¢¡ w2° = 0 (6.12)
(6.5) and (6.12) together yield Ll2 > L1. Moreover (6.11) and (6.12) imply equa-
tion (6.7). As a consequence there is no distortion for low-type consumer con-
cerning labor supply. Finally from FOC with respect to ¹X l2 one …nds:
p2¹l + ¸2
p2¹l
µl2Á
0
2
¡
¹X l2
¢¡ q° = 0 (6.13)
31The monetary transfers Rji will be derived later from the optimal allocation.
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>From (6.11) and (6.13) it follows that µl2Á
0
2
¡
¹X l2
¢¡qu0 ¡C l2¢ = 0: As a consequence
there is no distortion for low-type consumer concerning treatment quantity.
Regarding high-type consumers, from FOCs with respect to Ch2 :
p2¹h ¡ ¸2
p2¹h
u0
¡
Ch2
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.14)
Comparing the previous equation to (6.4) one …nds Ch2 < C1:
FOCs with respect to Lh2 and ¹X
h
2 respectively yield:
p2¹h ¡ ¸2
p2¹h
v0
¡
Lh2
¢¡ w2° = 0 (6.15)
p2¹hµ
h
2Á
0
2
¡
¹Xh2
¢¡ ¸2µl2Á02 ¡ ¹Xh2 ¢¡ p2¹hq° = 0 (6.16)
Comparing (6.15) to (6.5) it is evident that Lh2 > L1:
While from (6.14) and (6.15) it follows that w2u0
¡
Ch2
¢¡ v ¡Lh2¢ = 0: This im-
plies that there is no distortion for high-type not seriously ill consumer concerning
labor supply.
I showed that Ch2 < C
l
2 and L
h
2 > L
l
2; as a consequence, it must be R
h
2 < R
l
2:
Moreover, from the binding incentive constraint it follows ¹Xh2 > ¹X
l
2:
Solving (6.14) and (6.16) together yield to µh2Á
0
2
¡
¹Xh2
¢
< qu0
¡
Ch2
¢
(see Stiglitz
(1987) page 1005). This means that high-type not seriously ill consumer is forced
to consume too much treatment and too less aggregate consumption.
Concerning seriously ill consumers, from FOC with respect to C l3 one …nds:
p3¹l + ¸3
p3¹l
u0
¡
C l3
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.17)
such that, comparing with (6.4), C l3 > C1 holds. From FOC with respect to ¹X
l
3
one …nds:
p3¹l + ¸3
p3¹l
µl3Á
0
3
¡
¹X l3
¢¡ q° = 0 (6.18)
>From (6.17) and (6.19) it follows that µl3Á
0
3
¡
¹X l3
¢¡qu0 ¡C l3¢ = 0: As a consequence
there is no distortion for low-type consumer concerning treatment quantity.
>From FOC with respect to Ch3 :
p3¹h ¡ ¸3
p3¹h
u0
¡
Ch3
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.19)
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Comparing the previous equation to (6.4) it follows that Ch3 < C1:
As before, recalling that Ch3 < C
l
3; from the binding incentive constraint it
must be ¹Xh3 > ¹X
l
3:
FOC with respect to ¹Xh3 yields:
p3¹hµ
h
3Á
0
3
¡
¹Xh3
¢¡ ¸3µl3Á03 ¡ ¹Xh3 ¢¡ p3¹hq° = 0 (6.20)
Solving (6.19) and (6.20) together yield to µh3Á
0
3
¡
¹Xh3
¢
< qu0
¡
Ch3
¢
(again as in
Stiglitz (1987) page 1005). This means that high-type seriously ill consumer is
forced to consume too much treatment and too less aggregate consumption. Seri-
ously ill consumers’ self-selecting allocation in the case of in-kind reimbursement
is represented in the following …gure:
Uh3
Ul3
Xl3 Xh3
Ch3
Cl3
Xj3
Cj3
Figure 5: seriously ill consumers’ self-selecting allocation with in-kind
reimbursement.
Note that in-kind self-selecting allocation devotes more resources to high-type
than to low-type consumers just as the …rst-best allocation does (see …gure 3).
Proposition 6 summarizes the previous results.
Proposition 6 The optimal in-kind self-selecting allocation is such that: con-
tracts (C l2; ¹X
l
2; L
l
2) and (C
h
2 ; ¹X
h
2 ; L
h
2) verify C
l
2 > C
h
2 ; ¹X
l
2 < ¹X
h
2 and L
l
2 < L
h
2 :0
The monetary transfers are such that Rl2 > R
h
2 : There is no distortion for low-
type consumer. High type consumer is forced to consume too much treatment and
too less aggregate consumption ( µh2Á
0
2( ¹X
h
2 ) < qu
0(Ch2 )). Contracts (C
l
3;X
l
3) and
30
(Ch3 ; X
h
3 ) verify C
l
3 > C
h
3 and ¹X
l
3 < ¹X
h
3 : There is no distortion for low-type con-
sumer and high type consumer is forced to consume too much treatment and too
less aggregate consumption ( µh3Á
0
3( ¹X
h
3 ) < qu
0(Ch3 )).
It is important to notice that in-kind reimbursement exactly corresponds to
the direct mechanism in this adverse selection setting. Consumers announce their
type and receive the second-best (due to asymmetric information) allocation. All
the other relevant decisions are taken by the social planner. Interestingly, I shall
show in the next section that treatment cost reimbursement turns out to be an
indirect mechanism with which the social planner is able to implement the very
same in-kind allocation.
6.3. Reimbursement on treatment cost
Treatment cost reimbursement is characterized by …ve monetary transfers (P;Rj2; R
j
3),
by consumers’ labor supplies (Lji ) and by four cost-sharing parameters (®
j
i ); i =
2; 3 j = l; h. In particular insurance contracts are: (P;L1) for healthy consumers,
(Ll2; R
l
2; ®
l
2) and (L
h
2 ; R
h
2 ; ®
h
2) respectively for low and high-type not seriously ill
consumers and …nally (Rl3; ®
l
3) and (R
h
3 ; ®
h
3) respectively for low and high-type
seriously ill consumers. Contrary to the case of cash reimbursement, here also the
low-type seriously ill consumers are mimickers.
Concerning treatment, not seriously and seriously ill consumers will respec-
tively choose treatment quantity according to equations (6.21) and (6.22):
X¤j2 : µ
j
2Á
0
2 (X2)¡ ®j2qu0
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
j
2 ¡ ®jqX2
¢
= 0 (6.21)
X¤j3 : µ
j
3Á
0
3 (X3)¡ ®j3qu0
¡
Rj3 ¡ ®j3qX3
¢
= 0 (6.22)
while the mimickers will choose the preferred treatment quantity according to the
following equations32:
32In the Optimal Taxation literature, a standard assumption is that only linear commodity
taxes are implementable because transactions are anonymous. This means that the quantity
consumed by every consumer is not observable.
In the setting I analyze here with treatment cost reimbursement, the situation is di¤erent.
In fact consumers ask for reimbursement after their purchase has been done. As a consequence
treatment quantity is ex-post veri…able. Then, with this reimbursement method, the linear
taxation (subsidization) used by the insurer (the parameters ®ji ) corresponds to an ad hoc
restriction of the insurance instruments. Anyway, in the real word, the Health Authorities
frequently use linear subsidization of treatment.
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X¤lh2 : µ
l
2Á
0
2 (X2)¡ ®h2qu0
¡
w2L
h
2 +R
h
2 ¡ ®h2qX2
¢
= 0 (6.23)
X¤lh3 : µ
l
3Á
0
3 (X3)¡ ®h3qu0
¡
Rh3 ¡ ®h3qX3
¢
= 0 (6.24)
The social planner’s program then is8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Max
P;Rji ;®
j
i ;L
j
i
p1 [u(w1L1 ¡ P )¡ v(L1)]+
+p2
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
w2L
j
2 +R
j
2 ¡ ®j2qX¤j2
¡
µj2; L
j
2; R
j
2; ®
j
2
¢¢¡H2+
+µj2Á2
¡
X¤j2
¡
µj2; L
j
2; R
j
2; ®
j
2
¢¢¡ v(Lj2)¤+
+p3
X
j=l;h
¹j
£
u
¡
RC3 ¡ qX¤j3
¡
µj3; R
j
3; ®
j
3
¢¢¡H3 + µj3Á3 ¡X¤j3 ¡µj3; Rj3; ®j3¢¢¤
s:t: : p1P = p2
£
¹l
¡
Rl2 +
¡
1¡ ®l2
¢
qX¤l2
¢
+ ¹h
¡
Rh2 +
¡
1¡ ®h2
¢
qX¤h2
¢¤
+
+p3
£
¹l
¡
Rl3 +
¡
1¡ ®l3
¢
qX¤l3
¢
+ ¹h
¡
Rh3 +
¡
1¡ ®h3
¢
qX¤h3
¢¤
(°)
u
¡
w2L
l
2 +R
l
2 ¡ ®l2qX¤l2
¡
µl2; L
l
2; R
l
2; ®
l
2
¢¢
+ µl2Á2
¡
X¤l2
¡
µl2; L
l
2; R
l
2; ®
l
2
¢¢¡ v(Ll2) ¸
u
¡
w2L
h
2 +R
h
2 ¡ ®h2qX¤lh2
¡
µl2; L
h
2 ; R
h
2 ; ®
h
2
¢¢
+ µl2Á2
¡
X¤lh2
¡
µl2; L
h
2 ; R
h
2 ; ®
h
2
¢¢¡ v(Lh2) (¸2)
u
¡
Rl3 ¡ ®l3qX¤l3
¡
µl3; R
l
3; ®
l
3
¢¢
+ µl3Á3
¡
X¤l3
¡
µl3; R
l
3; ®
l
3
¢¢ ¸
u
¡
Rh3 ¡ ®h3qX¤h3
¡
µl3; R
h
3 ; ®
h
3
¢¢
+ µl3Á3
¡
X¤lh3
¡
µl3; R
h
3 ; ®
h
3
¢¢
(¸3)
Where ° 6= 0 and ¸2;¸3 ¸ 0 respectively are the budget constraint Lagrange
multiplier and the incentive constraints Khun Tucker multipliers.
>From FOCs with respect to P and L1 one respectively …nds equations (6.4)
and (6.5).
>From FOC with respect to Rl2 one …nds equation (6.6), such that, using
the (6.4), C l2 > C1 holds. Moreover, from FOC with respect to L
l
2 one …nds
again equation (6.7): there is no distortion for low-type not seriously ill consumer
concerning labor supply.
>From FOC with respect to ®l2 it follows:
X l2
£
p2¹lu
0 ¡C l2¢+ ¸2u0 ¡C l2¢¡ °p2¹l¤+ °p2¹l@X l2@®l2 ¡1¡ ®l2¢ = 0 (6.25)
such that, substituting (6.6), ®l2 = 1 holds: low-type not seriously ill consumer’s
treatment price is not distorted.
>From FOC with respect to Rh2 equation (6.8) follows, such that, using the
(6.4), Ch2 < C1 holds.
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>From FOC with respect to Lh2 one …nds again equation (6.9). As in session
7.2, it follows that Ll2 < L
h
2 : Moreover w2u
0 ¡Ch2 ¢ < v ¡Lh2¢ holds. That is, also
with non-uniform treatment cost, high-type not seriously ill consumer supplies
too much labor and consumes too less aggregate consumption.
Rearranging together FOCs with respect to ®h2 and R
h
2 it follows:
®h2 = 1 +
¸2u
0 ¡C lh2 ¢ ¡Xh2 ¡X lh2 ¢
°p2¹h
@Xh2
@®h2
(6.26)
where @X
h
2
@®h2
< 0; ° > 0 and, from (6.21) and (6.23), Xh2 ¡ X lh2 > 0: (6.26) shows
that ®h2 < 1 : high type not seriously ill consumer’s treatment price is subsidized.
Concerning seriously ill consumers, from FOC with respect to Rl3 one …nds
equation (6.17), such that, again, C l3 > C1: Moreover, FOC with respect to ®
l
3
yields:
X l3
£
p3¹lu
0 ¡C l3¢+ ¸3u0 ¡C l3¢¡ °p3¹l¤+ °p3¹l@X l3@®l3 ¡1¡ ®l3¢ = 0 (6.27)
such that, substituting (6.17), ®l3 = 1 holds: low-type seriously ill consumers’
treatment price is not distorted.
While, from FOC with respect to Rh3 one …nds:
u0
¡
Ch3
¢¡ ¸3
p3¹h
u0
¡
C lh3
¢¡ ° = 0 (6.28)
Comparing the previous equation to (6.4), one …nds Ch3 < C1.
Finally, from FOCs with respect to ®h3 and R
h
3 together it follows:
®h3 = 1 +
¸3u
0 ¡C lh3 ¢ ¡Xh3 ¡X lh3 ¢
°p3¹h
@Xh3
@®h3
(6.29)
where @X
h
3
@®h3
< 0; ° > 0 and, from (6.22) and (6.24), Xh3 ¡ X lh3 > 0: (6.29) shows
that ®h3 < 1 : high-type seriously ill consumer’s treatment price is subsidized.
Totally di¤erentiating (6.22) it is easy to verify that dR
j
3
d®j3
> 0: As a consequence
Rl3 > R
h
3 :
Seriously ill consumers’ self-selecting allocation in the case of treatment cost
reimbursement is represented in …gure 6 by the points A and B. In the …gure
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low-type consumer is indi¤erent between the allocation he can reach with the
budget constraint de…ned by
¡
Rl3; ®
l
3 = 1
¢
and the allocation he can reach with
the budget constraint de…ned by
¡
Rh3 ; ®
h
3 < 1
¢
:
U3l
U3h
X3j
C3j
R3l
R3h A
B
Figure 6 : seriously ill consumers’ self-selecting allocation with treatment cost
reimbursement.
Proposition 7 summarizes the previous results.
Proposition 7 The optimal treatment cost self-selecting allocation is such that:
contracts (Ll2; R
l
2; ®
l
2) and (L
h
2 ; R
h
2 ; ®
h
2) verify L
l
2 < L
h
2 ; C
l
2 > C
h
2 and ®
h
2 < ®
l
2 = 1:
There is no distortion for low-type consumer. On the contrary treatment consumed
by high-type consumer is subsidized and high type consumer is forced to supply too
much labor and to consume too less aggregate consumption (w2u0(Ch2 ) < v
0(Lh2)):
Contracts (Rl3; ®
l
3) and (R
h
3 ; ®
h
3) verify C
l
3 > C
h
3 ; R
l
3 > R
h
3 and ®
h
3 < ®
l
3 = 1:
There is no distortion for low-type consumer and treatment consumed by high-
type consumer is subsidized.
Treatment cost represents an indirect mechanism in this adverse selection prob-
lem. In fact consumers choose aggregate consumption and treatment after the
social planner has decided the parameters of the insurance contract. Considering
seriously ill consumers and looking at …gures 5 and 6 we see that with treatment
cost the in-kind allocation cannot be implemented because it is not incentive com-
patible. In other words, using treatment cost, the social planner could obtain an
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allocation with the same characteristics of the second-best one, but this would
imply an additional cost. Actually this is not a problem and the second-best allo-
cation can be obtained with treatment cost too. In fact, referring to the Taxation
Principle in the mechanism design literature, we know that the social planner can
o¤er a non linear schedule C3(X) which corresponds to the optimal non-linear tar-
i¤33. In particular this non-linear tari¤ allows to eliminate the ”undesired” parts
from the consumers’ budget constraints such that only the points corresponding
to the second-best allocation will be chosen at the equilibrium. Figure 7 shows
an example of optimal non-linear tari¤ which implements the second-best.
C3j
X3j
U3l
U3h
C3(X)
Figure 7: implementing the second-best with treatment cost reimbursement.
Concerning not seriously ill consumers, as before, the social planner imple-
ments the optimal non-linear tari¤ C2(X) such that only the second-best alloca-
tion is chosen at the equilibrium. Such non-linear tari¤ also depends on labor
supply (Lj2).
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33Note that this schedule is the non-linear equivalent of the pooling schedule C3(X) =
RTC3 ¡ ®3X which has been analyzed in section 4.3 when I treated uniform treatment cost
reimbursement.
34There is another possible interpretation of the self-selecting treatment cost allocation.
Consider seriously ill consumers and the mechanism fR(µ); ®(µ)g where consumers announce
both their type and the quantity of treatment they want to buy. The monetary transfer is
R(µ) = C + ®(µ)qX: Notice that here there is no possibility of misrepresenting the quantity
of treatment to purchase. In fact in equilibrium only two quantities of treatment are possible:
Xli and X
h
i : This means that low-type incentive constraints are similar to the in-kind program
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7. Comparing the alternative separating reimbursement plans
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 show that in-kind and treatment cost reimbursement are,
from a social welfare point of view, equivalent. The …rst corresponds to the
direct mechanism while the second corresponds to a payo¤ equivalent indirect
mechanism. Both allow to implement the second-best allocation.
Consider now the other reimbursement plans. Let start from a mix of reim-
bursement types and recall that it pays on treatment cost for outpatient care and
in-kind for inpatient care. From the previous consideration it follows that a mix of
types allows to implement the second-best allocation too. As a consequence a mix
of reimbursement types is, again from a social welfare point of view, equivalent
to in-kind and treatment cost reimbursement.
On the contrary, concerning cash reimbursement, as it has been said analyz-
ing uniform plans (Proposition 2) this reimbursement method uses one instrument
less with respect to treatment cost. As a consequence cash is weakly dominated
by treatment cost reimbursement. The following proposition establishes the re-
imbursement methods ranking in the case of self-selecting allocations.
Proposition 8 In the case of self-selecting allocations the reimbursement
methods ranking is as follows: in-kind reimbursement ¼ treatment cost reim-
bursement ¼ mix of types º cash reimbursement.
8. Conclusion
This work presents an institutional comparison of alternative health insurance re-
imbursement methods. In the model I compare in-kind reimbursement (IK) and
reimbursement insurance (in the paper treatment cost reimbursement (TC)) in a
model of public health insurance. Moreover the model provides a treatable frame-
work for systems which use a mix of in-kind and treatment cost reimbursement
(as an example the French system): outpatient care are reimbursed on treatment
cost and inpatient care are reimbursed in-kind.
The model explicitly considers serious and not serious illness which both have a
negative (but di¤erent) impact on labor productivity. Not seriously ill consumers
need outpatient care, while seriously ill ones need inpatient care. A key feature of
the model is consumers’ heterogeneity with respect to intensity of preferences for
ones (see the previous section) and the second-best allocation is implemented. As it is evident,
following this interpretation treatment cost becomes a direct mechanism too.
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treatment. Public insurance is fully informed on consumers’ health status but it
cannot observe preference for treatment. In this setting low-type consumers want
to mimic high type consumers. Facing low-type consumers incentive constraints,
public insurance can choose to implement a pooling allocation or a separating
one.
In the …rst part of the work I analyze pooling allocations. The main result is
that TCweakly dominates the mix of IK and TC payment which weakly dominates
IK reimbursement.
In the second part of the paper I analyze self-selecting allocations. Intuitively,
with these allocations the rationale for in-kind reimbursement should be stronger:
the self-selecting property of in-kind transfers should partially prevents from mim-
icking. The result con…rms this intuition: in-kind reimbursement corresponds to
the direct mechanism and then it is not dominated by any other reimbursement
method. Treatment cost corresponds to an indirect mechanism which is able to
implement the second-best allocation too and then, from a social welfare point
of view, it is equivalent to in-kind reimbursement. Not surprisingly also a mix of
types reimbursement turns out to be equivalent to in-kind and treatment cost.
Finally, the structure of the model may allow to consider also a setting with
asymmetric information with respect to the health status along the lines of the
Optimal Taxation literature (Stiglitz (1987)). In that case consumers can mimic
a worst state of health in order to work less and to get a better reimbursement.
Di¤erent health status corresponds to di¤erent earning ability so that there would
exist three groups of individuals: healthy, not seriously ill and seriously ill con-
sumers (w1 > w2 > w3 = 0): As usual, wiLi is observable but earning ability and
labor supply separately are not. Note that this means that seriously ill individ-
uals are not able to mimic. If provider behaves as a perfect agent for consumer,
when consumer wants to mimic, physicians certi…es a false state of health allow-
ing consumers to ask for a better reimbursement. It is reasonable to think that
consumers are interested in mimicking a worse state of health such that they are
able to work less and to obtain a larger reimbursement. In particular this means
that the sense of mimicking goes from healthy to ill individuals: an healthy con-
sumer can mimic a not seriously ill or a seriously ill one and a not seriously ill
consumer can mimic a seriously ill one. Consumers’ possibility to mimic depends
on the insurance plan structure. Thus, consequences of mimicking will be di¤erent
for di¤erent reimbursement types. In particular we expect that, weakening the
incentive constraint, in-kind reimbursement will partially prevent from mimick-
ing. To be more realistic, this setting should also explicitly take into account the
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health care provider, eventually considering collusive behavior between patient
and physician. These topics are left for future research.
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